Rene van den Brink
is Professor of Decision Theory at the Department of Econometrics and Operations Research at VU Amsterdam, and research fellow at the Tinbergen Institute. He studied Econometrics at Tilburg University where he also defended his PhD thesis entitled ‘Relational Power in Hierarchical Organizations’. His main research interests/expertise are in the fields of Game Theory, Economic Theory and (Economic and Social) Networks, but also extends to other fields as Social Choice Theory, Discrete Mathematics, Operations Research and Water Allocation Problems. His main research topic is to study relational structures in economic organizations, combining Game Theory and Networks.
Games on hierarchies
Various restrictions on coalition formation in cooperative games are studied in the literature. Famous restrictions arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. In this presentation, I will review several models of cooperative transferable utility games with a hierarchical structure on the player set. A central model is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure (directed graph), where some players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. Besides this model, we will discuss several generalizations, such as games on antimatroids, games on union closed systems and games with a local permission structures. Also, we mention some applications of games with a permission structure, such as auction games, polluted river games, joint liability games, digraph games and hierarchically structured firms.
is the Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of Economics at the California Institute of Technology. His research interests include revealed preference theory, the theory of two-sided matching, and game theory more broadly. He has coauthored a book ”Revealed Preference Theory” (Cambridge University Press, 2016) with Chris Chambers, and serves on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, Econometrica, and the Journal of Economic Theory.
Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments
(with Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang)
We propose to use endowments as a policy instrument in market design. Endowments give agents the right to enjoy certain resources. For example in school choice, one can ensure that low-income families have a shot at high-quality schools by endowing them with a chance of admission. Common policy objectives, such as walk-zone or sibling placement can be achieved through endowments (arguably more transparently than via priorities).
We introduce two new criteria in resource allocation problems with endowments. The first adapts the notion of justified envy to a model with endowments, while the second is based on market equilibrium. Using either criteria, we show that fairness (understood as the absence of justified envy) can be obtained together with efficiency and individual rationality.
is a professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and the Barcelona GSE. Her research interest is related to applied game theory. An important part of her research addresses situations with asymmetric information and studies the design of contracts and incentives. Her book ”An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts” (joint with David Pérez-Castrillo) is used in many universities as a textbook. She is fellow of the European Economic Association (EEA), the Spanish Economic Association (EEA) and the CESIfo, and elected member of the Academia Europaea.
Agency Contracts in a Matching Market
Considering moral hazard problems in a matching market may affect the predictions of the classical principal-agent model and it provides new insights for understanding the attributes of the partners that match and the characteristics of the incentive contracts.
From the point of view of the agency theory, the interest of this extension is easy to understand. The partial equilibrium approach characterizes the optimal incentive scheme for a given principal-agent partnership. In this approach, the bargaining power is exogenously given to principals or agents, which implies that an exogenous reservation utility condition for the agent (or for the principal) determines the distribution of surplus and the form of the contract. However, when one considers explicitly the existence of several heterogeneous principals and several heterogeneous agents, some of the properties obtained in the simple version of the agency problem do not necessarily hold.
From the point of view of matching theory, the consideration of incentives between partners is a natural extension of the assignment game, where the outcome is not only a matching and a vector of prices but a matching and a vector of incentive contracts, one for each partnership.
from Tel Aviv University is the past Executive officer of the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society, the Director of the Beno Arbel program for gifted young students, and the Academic Director of the Israeli team to the IMO. His research interests include stochastic games, stopping games, games with vector payoffs, and games with differential information. Together with Michael Maschler and Shmuel Zamir he co-authored the textbook ”Game Theory”.
Quitting games are a subclass of both stopping games and stochastic games. In these two classes of games, the existence of equilibrium is known only when few players are involved (three in the case of stopping games, two in the case of stochastic games) or under severe restrictions on the payoffs and/or transitions. In this talk, I will explain the difficulty in studying this problem, survey known results, and present techniques that are used to prove them.
The SING15 conference programme will consist of a small number invited lectures by highly distinguished scholars in the field and a larger number contributed papers, which are selected among all applications by a scientific committee of established researchers in the field to ensure a high scientific standard of the papers presented at the conference.
However, also contributions from Ph.D. students and researchers being at the beginning of their career are explicitly invited and a Best Paper Prize is awarded. Participants from all over the world are welcome to attend the conference. The language of the meeting is English.
The organizers welcome contributions from all areas of game theory, including, but not limited to:
- Cooperative games and their applications
- Mechanism design
- Dynamic games
- Evolutionary games
- Stochastic games
- Voting and power indices
- Learning and experimentation in games
- Computational game theory
- Game theory applications in fields such as:
- management, energy, health policy, industrial organization, and others